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TOP SECRET

SUMMARY

GENERAL

	73	VESTERN EUR	ODF	• .	
(page 4).	velcome mee erence in lo	ting with Austr cal administrat ety over Allied	ian Foreign I ion disturbs	Austrian go	vernment
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GENERAL

	membership:	25X1		
		Foreign Moppose NA	Minister Lange now ATO membership fo	intends at Ottawa to or Greece and Turke
25X1	Norway or the Ne	but will fi o. The Norwegians, h membership if support therlands. US Ambas wegian support for a v	ted by one other cou sador Bay points or	y believe Denmark is untry, presumably ut that should the
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	Approved F	or Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300660001-5	25X1
_		WESTERN EUROPE	
5X1A 3 ,	Tito would welco	ome meeting with Austrian Foreign Minister:	
		The Yugoslav Minister in Vienna has inform trian Foreign Minister Gruber that Marsh would welcome a meeting in Yugoslavia so before 15 October. The proposed discuss cover boundary questions, trade relations Soviettactics, and mutual defense. Grub to commit himself to the meeting before c tation with other Austrian cabinet minister US Legation in Vienna is strongly opposed discussion and has considered an attempt to courage Gruber from undertaking the trip	al Tito ome time sion would s, anti- er refused onsul- rs. The to the so dis-
	sence of an Austr USSR apparently the Soviet position ship for the Titoin settlement in Australy along	Comment: An Austro-Yugoslav defense a luded as a subject of conversation, appears premature rian army, and might cause an adverse Soviet reaction. has not considered the Austrian treaty negotiations apart vis-a-vis Yugoslavia, any Austrian move suggestive st cause might jeopardize further the possibility of a four tria. In view of well-known Austrian antipathy for Yugos the border areas, it is somewhat doubtful that moves between the two countries would be universally popular rian side.	in the ab- Since the t from of friend- ir-power oslavia, toward
25X1A	Soviet interference	ce in local administration disturbs Austrian governmen	<u>ıt:</u>
	Gruber stated that	Foreign Minister Gruber has advised the Ution in Vienna that continued Soviet interfered local administrative and judicial matters had the Austrian Cabinet to complain once more and. Describing Soviet meddling as "perhaps growing in the absence of corrective measures, his government ethe issue in parliament and to protest to the Allied Cou-4-	ence in as forced re to the worse, "
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Comment: Wide publicity has been given to Soviet unilateral interferences by the Austrian press in recent weeks. The objectionable actions usually consist of an assumption of police powers by local commanders, countermanding of Austrian directives, and intervention in court proceedings. While demonstrating some sensitivity to Austrian protests, Soviet authorities have not heretofore been willing to sacrifice immediate objectives -- or to discipline local commanders -- for the sake of good public relations.

ere appearing in the coalition and that the for going too far to meet Allied wishes. The cicularly anxious that an agreement acceptable
d in Washington.

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have answered many of the government's conditions.

the rearmament issue in conjunction with some sort of Allied agreement restoring German sovereignty. Although the details of the Foreign Ministers' agreements on Germany are not yet clear, the Washington accord appears to

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